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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
death of Elsie Hoeppner. It is this last mutually agreeable will
that binds the hand of Emil Hoeppner and determines the dis-
position of the estate of Emil Hoeppner in a court of equity.
2 7
The two cases discussed have shown the problems that arise when
a will or wills are made pursuant to a contract. When, and if, such
contracts are held effective during the lives of the respective testators,
additional problems will be created.
THOAIAS A. ERDMANN
Constitutional Law: Libel and Slander: Extent of Comment
About Public Official Under the First Amendment- Rosenblatt v.
Baer: On March 9, 1964, the United States Supreme Court decided
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' holding that under the First Amend-
ment a public official may not recover damages for false and defamatory
statements about his public conduct unless he shows that the statement
was motivated by actual malice. The Times case thus ended a division
among American courts on the question of whether the immunity pro-
tecting fair comment on the conduct of public officials and the qualifi-
cation of candidates for public office should be supplemented by a
qualified privilege to make false and defamatory statements about them.2
The question of how far beyond candidates for public office the
designation "public official" went was then left for later decision. The
Court in the Times case stated it would not at that time "determine how
far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public
official' designation would extend for purposes of this rule or otherwise
to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included."'
The Times case therefore is said only to apply to debate on "public is-
sues" designed to bring about "political and social changes desired by
the people." 4
The Court made its first attempt to further define the term "public
official" in Rosenblatt v. Baer,5 in which a former supervisor of a
county-owned ski resort had recovered a $31,500 judgment from an
unpaid columnist for the Laconia (N. H.) Evening Citizen. The col-
umnist had made statements about the relatively low profits realized by
the ski area when the plaintiff was the supervisor. The main question
in the article, which could be understood to imply peculation, was,
"What happened to all the money last year and every other year ?"
2732 Wis.2d 339, 347, 145 N.W.2d 754, 759 (1966).
1376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2 Note, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284 (1964). Also see Noel, Defamation of Public
Officers and Candidates 49 COL. L. REV. 875 (1949) and Veeder, Freedom of
Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1910). For the development of the
law of defamation generally, see Lewis, The Individual Members Right to
Recover for Defamation, 17 U. MIAmI L. REV. 519-525 (1963).
3 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
4 Note, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284, 288 (1964).
5 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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At the outset of the Rosenblatt decision, the Court rejected any
possibility that a state court's definition of "public official" would be
used in the case. It added that it was not necessary to set down a pre-
cise definition for the purpose of this case. It indicated, rather, that the
definition would be expanded on a decision-by-decision basis. However,
the Court indicated the necessity of free criticism of those responsible
for government operations, lest criticism of government itself be
criticized.
"It is clear therefore that the 'public official' designation
applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of govern-
ment employees who have or appear to the public to have,
substantial responsibility for or control over conduct of govern-
mental affairs.'"
This, when coupled with the facts in the Times case where the
one claiming libel was Commissioner of Public Affairs, whose duties
were to supervise the Police Department, Fire Department, Department
of Cemetery and Department of Scales, gives little indication of how
far the Court will ultimately go in extending the "public official" de-
finition.8
In Rosenblatt, the Court again discussed the Times definition of
"malice." It split on the question of whether to extend the areas in
which defamatory falsehoods are protected absolutely. Douglas and
Black reiterated their absolute privilege theory of the Times case, in
which they thought there was an absolute right to print anything with-
out sanction by the state regardless of malice.9 Professor Pedrick points
out the problem of this approach:
The concurring Justices, Black, Douglas, and Goldberg, would
extend an absolute privilege to anyone who chooses to attack a
public official. In their view a completely open season on public
officials would best serve the public interest. Fabricated charges
of embezzlement of public funds, of bribery, of espionage for a
foreign power, could be made freely and without accountability
under this view. We have had figures on the American political
scene who behaved as though they thought that might be the law
of libel. The test run afforded by their careers ought to be
enough now to condemn the hunting license approach to political
debate. Fortunately for the country, the concurring Justices
numbered only three and it is hoped this number will represent
the high water mark for suppoit of this "absolutist" approach.' 0
,Baer v. Rosenblatt, 106 N.H. 26, 203 A.2d 773 (1964).
7 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
8 The significance of New York Times v. Sullivan to the civil rights move-
ment is brought out by Professor Kalven: Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendinent, 1964 Sup. CT. REv.
191.
9 See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) and also Pedrick, Freedom
of the Press and The Lawt of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49
CORNELL L. Q. 581 (1964). Also see Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 284 (1964).
10 This is the same position taken by Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
19661
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In the Rosenblatt decision, Douglas recognized the problem brought
out by Professor Pedrick but felt that the risk of abusing free speech
as in the late forties and early fifties was worth taking when juxtaposed
with any kind of limitation on speech." It is possible, however, that the
majority decision, requiring that there be a public official and actual
malice, will eliminate to some extent the dire consequences of absolute
freedom on one extreme and of no freedom on the other.
Douglas's concurring opinion seemed to present the basic problem
of the Baer decision. He pointed out that there is no way of drawing
lines to exclude anyone on the public payroll, such as the typist or night
watchman. He saw no way to protect anyone who is a member of an
agency in the public domain. There seems to be little doubt that this is
the major difficulty of the majority opinion. Did Baer, by his contract
of employment, assume the risk of verbal attack of the kind upheld in
this case? If so, would the typist, or night watchman of the ski hill also
be vulnerable? If they are, it seems that the Court has extended the
Times decision too far.
The solution offered by Douglas may be the best answer and the
one the Court will ultimately arrive at. He said the question should be
whether a "public issue," not a "public official" was involved. This
would allow a demarcation between the spurious common law of sedi-
tious libel and the genuine common law of civil liability for defamation
of private character. The definition by Douglas would eliminate a prob-
lem which arose from the Times case. That case stated that the privilege
applied only to official conduct of public officials. A private matter of
a public official, however can become of utmost public significance.12
Douglas states that this problem would be solved by using the term,
"public issue" instead of "public official." Although the Court will
probably not surrender its "public official" term, it may adopt "public
issue" as part of the definition or else find another way to include it
in the definition.
When applying Douglas's standard to the facts in Rosenblatt v. Baer,
the Court could find (and did) that a public official is involved in the
case. However, if "public issue" were added to the "public official"
criterion, it would be necessary for the defendant to show not only that
and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Blacks' concur-
ring opinion in the latter case shows the dire consequences of allowing such
suits to companies such as Columbia Broadcasting System.
"See Pedrick, Senator McCarthy and the Law of Libel: A Study of Two Can-
'aign Speeches, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 135 (1953). Prof. Pedrick disagrees with
Black's and Douglas' position: Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law
of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNFLL L. Q. 581, 596 (1964).
Also se Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 903 (1960).
12 The incident was graphically brought out in Tabbel, Thunder on the Thames,
The British Press and the Profumo Case, Saturday Review, July 13, 1963,
p. 44, and Letter from London: Profumo Case, New Yorker, June 29, 1963,
p. 66, which may help to recall the case.
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the defamed person was a public official but also that a significant public
issue was present. Whether or not the Court would think the profits at
a public ski hill was a public issue significant enough to allow the in-
ferential remarks made by the defendant is doubtful. The definition
would also prevent the random selection of people employed in a
beauracracy from being as freely attacked.
CONCLUSION
With the Times case, the Supreme Court federalized the libel laws
pertaining to public officials and ruled that a head of a police department
was a public official, and therefore any remarks made about him, re-
gardless of the truthfulness or falsity, were privileged provided they
were not motivated by actual malice. The three concurring Justices
wanted the "public official" designation abolished completely. 13
The Rosenblatt case reaffirmed the Times decision and began the
refinement of the term "public official" by finding the superintendent of
the ski area a public official and by saying that at the very least, the
definition covers those who have or appear to the public to have con-
trol over conduct of governmental affairs.14
The future may find the majority linking the term "public issue"
to the definition. Decisions will also pinpoint more exactly how far
down the line of governmental officials the Court will go. Finally,
cases involving sports figures,'5 entertainers, etc., where the problem
becomes whether "public men," "public institutions," and "public is-
sues" are to be included in the "public official" definition will have to
be decided. The Rosenblatt case indicates the need for a more precise
and limited definition of who falls under the Times rule of a public
official.
JAmES P. LONSDORF
Executors and Trustees: Improper Exercise of Discretionary
Power to Sell Real Estate: In Estate of ScheibeI the will declared
a residuary trust and gave the "executors and trustees full power of
sale of any interest which I may have in any real estate without special
court authority." 2 The testator died on March 11, 1958, and among
13 See Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 903 (1960). The
concurring Justices for absolute privilege were Black, Douglas and Gold-
berg. Green develops their theory.
14 See Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 284, 287 (1964), where it was suggested that it was
already virtually certain that the immunity will include statements about
politically appointed as well as elected officials like a justice of the peace or a
village clerk, whose exercise of power is restricted to very small communities.
Is E.g., Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc.2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 259, 534, 535
(1964).
130 Wis.2d 116, 140 N.W.2d 196 (1966).
2 Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Estate of Scheibe, 30 Wis.2d 116, 140 N.VW.2d 196
(1966). In situations where there is no express power of sale in the governing
instrument, no statutory authorization and no inherent power to sell, the
fiduciary must seek court permission to sell and will obtain this only if there
1966]
